Is inflation targeting best-practice monetary policy? by Jon Faust & Dale W. Henderson
ranking the ITF relative to some set of ad hoc alter-
natives, such as the current practices at central banks
around the world.
Of course, the ITF community is now large and
varied. We focus mainly on the industrialized coun-
tries. One might say that we consider the role of
the ITF in a low-inflation steady-state and do not
address the important question of how it might help
in reaching such a steady-state. In much of the paper
we seek to highlight some generic issues. In doing
so, we do not mean to suggest that there are not
important differences among the practices of ITF
central banks: Our points will apply in varying
degrees to ITF and other central banks.1
Our main message can be summarized suc-
cinctly. Common wisdom and conventional models
suggest that best-practice policy can be summarized
in terms of two goals: First, get mean inflation right;
second, get the variance of inflation right. The ITF
is of great help in achieving the first goal; whether
it helps in achieving the second is more problematic.
The argument goes as follows. Everyone now agrees
that mean inflation should be modest. The ITF may
be seen as a constructive attempt to cement the
current consensus on this point. Unfortunately,
agreement regarding the mean inflation rate has
few practical implications at any finite horizon. Many
of the most contentious debates over the conduct
of policy in the postwar era are not about the mean
but about the variance of inflation. That is, under
what conditions should the central bank allow or
promote movements of inflation around the mean
in order to promote other goals such as real and
1 There are excellent taxonomies of the approaches used by different
ITF central banks. See, e.g., Bernanke et al. (1999), Debelle (2003), and
Truman (2003).
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1. INTRODUCTION
T
he core requirements of inflation targeting
are an explicit long-run inflation goal and a
strong commitment to transparency. The
framework built around these requirements has
much to recommend it. Inflation and output per-
formance in economies using the inflation-targeting
framework (ITF) has been good by historical stan-
dards, and both governments and central banks
claim to be pleased with the framework. Advocates
and practitioners of the ITF have been leaders in
shaping and exploiting the new consensus that
central bank transparency can make policy more
effective. Not only are ITF central banks among
the most transparent in the world, they have experi-
mented aggressively with ways to make communica-
tion with the public more effective. In the process,
they have pioneered the use of various tools, such
as fan charts, that make conveying essential, but
difficult, concepts practical.
Economic performance in some non-ITF econ-
omies, such as the United States, has also been good
in recent years. However, several ITFers (Mishkin,
1999, and Bernanke et al., 1999) argue that this
outcome has resulted in spite of the policymaking
frameworks in those countries. Thus, they argue
that the United States and others should “fix the
roof while the sun is shining.”
The recent hurricane in Washington has
reminded many of us of the wisdom of this reason-
ing. It has also reminded us that even attractive new
roofs—roofs that have weathered a few spring rains—
might bear inspection. In that spirit, we examine
whether the ITF constitutes best-practice monetary
policy. We use the standard of some mythical best-
practice policy to emphasize that we are not simply
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financial stability? We argue that the ITF does not
constitute best-practice in resolving this question.
This claim is not new; it has also been made by both
critics and supporters of the ITF, including Kohn
(forthcoming), Benjamin Friedman (2003), and
Svensson (1999).
Of course, the ITF emerged near the end of a
period of high inflation in the industrialized econ-
omies, when the most important challenge for policy
was getting the mean right.2 As a period of generally
low and stable inflation has emerged, more attention
has been focused on the potential role of other goals
in policy, and greater emphasis both in the academic
literature and in ITF practice has been placed on the
role of other goals. Our main critical point is not
simply that there is more left to do. Rather, we argue
that various features of the ITF—for example, the
way the preeminence of the inflation goal is stated—
obscure rather than facilitate the communication
of best-practice policy.
Although we talk a great deal about the second
goal of policy, getting the variance right, we empha-
size that getting the mean right may be the goal of
greatest importance. Arguably, the largest mistakes
in the postwar era have been associated with failures
to achieve this goal. Further, as a profession we are
more certain about our advice regarding the mean
of inflation and more confident that central banks
can get it right. At a minimum, the best-practice
policy framework should stress the goal that we are
more clear about and that we are more confident
central banks can achieve.
Finally, we raise many issues that are in principle
subject to empirical investigation and, therefore,
may one day be resolved. We focus on issues not
currently amenable to clear empirical resolution.
We do raise some questions for future empirical
assessment.
In the next two sections we characterize the ITF
in more detail and discuss some claims about the
economy that underlie the approach. Our charac-
terization, and our thinking more generally, rely
heavily on such seminal work as Bernanke and
Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) and sev-
eral contributions by Svensson including Svensson
(1997a). The following three sections deal at a fairly
abstract level with macroeconomic and political-
economy aspects of the ITF. In the final two sections,
we return to reality, discussing some complicating
factors missing from the earlier analysis and then
making some constructive suggestions.3
2. WHAT IS THE INFLATION-TARGETING
FRAMEWORK?
2.1 Central Elements
One summary view of the ITF is provided by
Bernanke et al. (1999, hereafter BLMP):
Inflation targeting is a framework for mone-
tary policy characterized by the public
announcement of official quantitative targets
(or ranges) for the inflation rate over one or
more horizons, and by explicit acknowledg-
ment that low and stable inflation is mone-
tary policy’s primary long-term goal. Among
other important features of inflation target-
ing are vigorous efforts to communicate with
the public about the plans and objectives of
the monetary authorities, and, in many cases,
mechanisms that strengthen the central
bank’s accountability for attaining those
objectives. (p. 4, italics added)
We have italicized what we believe to be central
elements. At the most general level, these elements
can be summarized as follows: Set an explicit, long-
run inflation goal, give that goal a certain preemi-
nence, and communicate vigorously about the
conduct of policy relative to that goal. What may not
be clear from the passage above is that ITF advocates
also recommend taking into account goals other than
inflation—for example, real and financial stability—
and call for thorough communication about these
goals. All major ITF banks have such goals.
We will regularly refer to two core requirements
of the ITF: (i) set a long-run inflation goal and (ii)
strive vigorously for transparency regarding all goals
and aspects of policy.
These requirements might be viewed as
innocuous. A long-run inflation target need have
few finite-horizon implications. As Keynes (1923,
p. 80) famously put it in discussing earlier monetary
reforms,
But this long run is a misleading guide to cur-
rent affairs. In the long run we are all dead.
3 Gavin (2004) also makes useful suggestions for improving the ITF
framework.
2 Truman (2003) emphasizes the important distinction between actual
or potential inflation targeters that have essentially achieved their
desired mean inflation rates and those that have not. He provides a
thorough analysis of the experience with inflation targeting and argues
that mutual understanding among the major central banks would be
significantly increased if they all adopted inflation targeting.
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The remaining core requirement is transparency.
While how best to achieve transparency is a difficult
question, that transparency is important seems
uncontroversial; rather, it seems to be the new
orthodoxy.
Based on these core requirements alone, it would
be difficult to understand why the ITF has generated
such strong sentiment for and against.
Going beyond the core requirements, advocates
portray the full-blown ITF as a framework of “con-
strained discretion” and claim that it has great advan-
tages over “purely discretionary” policy as practiced,
say, at the Federal Reserve. In this paper, we attempt
to identify which requirements of the ITF, beyond
the core, give rise to such claims and then discuss
whether these features should unambiguously be
included among the requirements for best-practice.
2.2 Rules Versus Discretion
One definitional question that arises immediately
is whether the ITF is best viewed as a “rule” or the
exercise of “discretion.” Proponents such as BLMP
and Svensson appear to differ on this matter, so it is
important for us to make our view clear at the outset.
BLMP contend that the ITF is “not a rule in the
classical sense” (p. 22); that is, it is not a forcing rule—
a constraint on behavior that cannot be circumvented.
They note that, “an inflation-targeting framework
will not directly prevent counterproductive attempts
of a central bank to apply short-run stimulus. In
this respect, inflation targeting is inferior to an iron-
clad rule” (p. 24).
In contrast, Svensson (1999) argues that the
ITF is a rule. We think that there is no contradiction
here: Svensson is simply using a different definition.
He mentions the standard definition, but provides
an alternative under which advice to the central
bank about how to use its discretion is a rule.4 For
purposes of this discussion, the important point is
that a Svensson-type rule does not represent even an
approximation to a forcing rule. Any consequences
of ignoring Svensson-type rules are contingent on
the reaction of the public. Thus, in our view the ITF
is a typical example of discretion in the classical
sense, and we treat it as such in what follows.
2.3 What the “Discretion” View Implies
for Analyzing the ITF
Much standard policy advice comes in the form
of concrete suggestions about how to pursue the
goals of policy. Such advice often is either codified
in the form of a reaction function or can reasonably
be so codified for the purposes of study. In these
cases, one can take some set of interesting macro
models and run horse races among the implied
reaction functions. One can also solve for the optimal
rule and measure the inefficiency of the proposed
rules relative to the optimum. Based on the results
from several models, one can make statements about
robustness and so on.
Many critics of the ITF have adopted a rules
interpretation, but BLMP argue that these exercises
completely miss the point (p. 21).5 BLMP argue along
the lines we have been discussing: The ITF does not
place any constraints on the central bank that force
it to deviate from the social optimum. Thus, it is not
sensible to compare ITF outcomes to the optimum—
the ITF can attain the optimum.6
It may seem like cheating to propose a frame-
work and then simply to stipulate that it delivers
optimal policy in model-based horse races. What
role does this leave for policy research? We can dis-
tinguish two strands of the policy literature, which
might be called institutional design and day-to-day
implementation. If a forcing rule for central bank
behavior is feasible and optimal, these two collapse
to one: Implement the forcing rule. If judgment must
be exercised by the policymaker, these two interact
but can be clearly distinguished. Research on insti-
tutional design seeks to define the optimal frame-
work within which judgment will be exercised.
Research on day-to-day implementation seeks to
generate insights that will help policymakers exercise
their judgment. The horse-race exercises may shed
little direct light on the question of institutional
design, but may be of great value in informing the
ITF policymaking board regarding how best to use
its discretion.
5 Examples are Friedman and Kuttner (1996), Jensen (2002), and Kim
and Henderson (2002).
6 This statement is correct, so long as the social optimum is consistent
with hitting a long-run inflation objective, as it is in virtually all horse-
race models. There are many possible optima given by various discre-
tion and commitment solutions. Exactly which one is reached depends
on considerations (communication policy, etc.) that are generally left
out of horse-race models. As we will explain, it is these considerations
that are supposed to ensure that the ITF yields the right optimum.
4 In simple models, there is a multitude of formally equivalent ways of
recommending that the central bank optimize; an example is “satisfy
your first-order conditions.” Svensson (1999) examines several interest-
ing exact and approximate ways to recommend optimization in the
linear-quadratic framework.




The reasoning supporting the ITF rests on several
features of common ground in the macroeconomics
profession and the policy community. Ultimately,
some confusion about the ITF seems to arise because
there are ITFers on both sides of a familiar dispute.
In this section, we survey both the common ground
and the disputed ground.
3.1 Macro Common Ground
3.1.1 Best-Practice Monetary Policy Would
Deliver Low, Stable Inflation. Inflation should be
stationary, perhaps with infrequent, small mean
shifts. Its mean should be low, certainly above zero
and below 5 percent. Its variability should be suffi-
ciently small that annual inflation is within 1 or 2
percentage points of the mean most of the time.
Many technical issues may arise in giving this claim
greater precision, but some version of it is now
nearly universally accepted. This claim rests on
three more basic claims.
First, there is no long-run Phillips-curve trade-off
of the traditional variety. Failure to recognize this
“fact” was surely behind some mistakes of the past,
and Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) deserve
great credit for pointing this out.7
Second, marginal positive expected inflation
above some low rate is welfare-reducing. The profes-
sion can now list a multitude of channels through
which expected inflation can affect welfare by reduc-
ing growth or in other ways. Widespread acceptance
of the second claim rests neither on an appeal to a
particular channel nor on incontrovertible econo-
metric estimates of the costs of inflation. Nonethe-
less, in this paper we take for granted the common
position that, above fairly low levels, raising mean
inflation is bad.
Third, marginal decreases in expected inflation
below some low, positive level are welfare-reducing.
The recent experience of Japan and the return of
low inflation in many countries has led economists
to explore a number of channels through which
deflation could be harmful. We will not focus much
on deflation, but it is important to emphasize that
inflation costs are two-sided.
3.1.2 There Is a Conventional Short-Run
Phillips Curve Trade-off. There may be many
short-run trade-offs, but for concreteness we focus
on the one that is most familiar to and relevant
for many economists: the short-run Phillips-curve
relation. We will take it as given that real activity
is not always at the most efficient level and define
the output gap as actual output minus efficient out-
put. Policy actions that increase the gap are associ-
ated with a rise in inflation relative to steady-state
inflation. As the next point makes clear, we do not
mean to imply that best-practice policy can success-
fully exploit this trade-off.
3.1.3 The Economy Is Complicated. Econ-
omic complications may include policy lags, chang-
ing relationships, the potential for self-fulfilling
equilibria, and other nonlinearities. Finally, describ-
ing the state of the economy may require a high-
dimensional state variable.
For a brief period, some leading members of
the profession believed we were reaching the point
where our understanding of economic dynamics
allowed considerable range for beneficial interven-
tion in business cycle dynamics. Friedman argued
against this view, claiming that policy acted with
long, variable, and unpredictable lags.8 Building on
Friedman, Lucas famously added the Lucas critique
to the list of complications.9 The general view that
the economy is very complex is now widely accepted
by academics and policymakers, for example,
Greenspan (2003).
3.1.4 Due to Political-Economy Problems,
Institutional Design Matters. There are various
time-consistency, game theoretic, and institutional
problems that might cause the government to set
policy away from the social optimum.10 We lump all
these under the title of political-economy problems.
The profession still disagrees about the importance
of, for example, time-consistency problems over
the postwar era. But even those who feel that time
consistency was not a big issue probably agree that
institutional design is important. Some version of
the claim that governments may have an incentive
8 See Friedman (1948, 1959).
9 See Lucas (1976).
10 Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) initiated a
large literature on time consistency. There are many good treatments
of the political-economy issues, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and
Persson and Tabellini (2002).
7 This first claim is sometimes stated as the claim that expected inflation
does not affect real variables in the long run. When stated this way,
the myriad ways that expected inflation leads to welfare losses are
presented as exceptions.  Recently, considerable attention has been
focused on the possibility that expected inflation might affect output
because wages and prices are set in staggered contracts that are not
fully indexed.  See, for example, Wolman (2001).
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to exploit inflation surprises has been a common
belief since the first time a government debased
its currency.
3.2 Long-Disputed Ground
Whether monetary policy can beneficially
exploit the short-run trade-off between inflation
and the output gap is a long-standing dispute that
is still at the center of monetary policy discussions.
3.2.1 No Exploitable Trade-offs. Friedman,
and later Lucas, forcefully argue that given the
inherent complexity of the economy and our regret-
tably limited knowledge of it, the ambitions of
monetary policy should be limited to achieving
nominal stability. Their arguments are based on the
view that monetary policy has strong short-run real
effects but that there is no way monetary policy
can beneficially exploit them. They both suggest
that a cautious response in the form of a k-percent
rule for money growth is the best way to achieve
nominal stability.
Some ITFers hold the no exploitable trade-offs
view (NET) and might well be called neo-
Friedmanites. The NETers follow Friedman and Lucas
in asserting that any trade-offs that exist cannot be
successfully exploited, so that best-practice can only
hope to achieve nominal stability. However, they
argue that inflation stabilization is the best way to
achieve nominal stability.11 They are at least as pes-
simistic as Lucas and Friedman about complications
in the economy. Nevertheless, they argue that achiev-
ing inflation stability requires judgment and looking
at a wide range of information variables (a “look at
everything” strategy) and may require frequent
changes in the instruments of policy.
Orphanides (2003b) provides support for the
NET view and discusses its roots in Friedman. Ernst
Welteke (2003), president of the Bundesbank and
member of the governing council of the European
Central Bank, has also clearly stated the NET view.
Mishkin (2002) and BLMP both state the case for
the NET view clearly, but, as we will explain, they
belong in another camp.
What we will call the singular economy view is
an alternative route to the NET position. In this view
the economy is stochastically singular in a helpful
way: Stabilizing inflation automatically achieves any
other goals of policy. For example, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), King and Wolman (1999), and
Goodfriend and King (2001) produce simple models
that exhibit a happy coincidence of the goals of
stabilizing inflation and the output gap.12
Thus, either a vexing complexity or a fortuitous
simplicity of the economy can get one to the view
that there are no exploitable trade-offs.
3.2.2 Limited Exploitable Trade-offs. Fine-
tuning the real and nominal economy is overly
ambitious. In the limited exploitable trade-offs view
(LET), there is some beneficially exploitable short-
run trade-off between real activity and inflation,
and best-practice policy exploits it. LETers, like
NETers, contend that best-practice cannot be imple-
mented using a rigid rule or by following a formal
model. Studying optimal policy in formal models
serves mainly to inform our collective wisdom, and
this wisdom should be applied deftly in practice.
Many, if not most, advocates of the ITF are LETers.
For example, Svensson and Woodford belong in the
LET camp: In numerous papers, such as Svensson
(1997a) and Svensson and Woodford (forthcoming),
they describe the ITF as involving optimal exploita-
tion of the short-run trade off. BLMP also belong in
this camp. Despite the claim of President Welteke
of the Bundesbank cited above, we suspect that most
central banks are in the LET camp, but this empiri-
cal claim need not detain us.
3.2.3 Comments. In both views, no rigid rule
is appropriate, and policy must be based on a review
of a wide variety of information. Neither camp takes
an a priori stance on whether best-practice policy
is “activist” in the sense of requiring frequent
adjustment of instruments. Only in the LET camp
is policy “activist” in the sense of attempting to
manage the business cycle.
Because NETers argue that policy should only
aim for inflation stability, they are open to the criti-
cism that they are inflation nutters—which we take
to mean that inflation is the only thing in the loss
function. This criticism is misplaced: NETers are not
nutters. The NETer argues from standard preferences
that achieving nominal stability is the best we can
hope for.
12 In these models, only the price of the single composite good is affected
by staggered contracts. There are at least two standard modifications
that imply trade-offs. The first is adding a cost shock to the price-setting
equation for the single good as in, for example, Kiley (1998), McCallum
and Nelson (1999), and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999). This modifi-
cation is incorporated into the simple model we will present here. The
second modification is to assume that the wage of composite labor
(or the price of a second composite good) is affected by staggered
contracts, as in, for example, Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).
11 One might also imagine a neo-Friedmanite view centered on other
notions of nominal stability, such as nominal income stability. Given
the topic of the paper, we do not develop this idea.
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While the NET and LET views are distinct, in
practice it is sometimes difficult to tell which view
various parties take. Several problems emerge. First,
some LETers believe that the degree of exploitability
is quite low; thus, the views need not be that far apart.
Second, virtually everyone agrees that demand
shocks push us toward the singular economy perspec-
tive. That is, in many standard models, demand
shocks temporarily increase the output gap and raise
inflation. Thus, smoothing inflation and the gap
suggest roughly the same response. While limiting
attention to demand shocks does not lead to exact
singularity in most models, it certainly reduces the
importance of the difference between the NET and
LET views.
Supply shocks provide an interesting litmus test
for deciding whether one is in the NET or LET camp.
Consider a sharp increase in commodity prices. In
many standard models, this shock tends to push
inflation up and push output below the efficient
level.13 Even if one leaves commodity prices out of
the inflation measure, there will be indirect upward
pressure on inflation. BLMP conclude that “a supply
shock that is great enough or that arises from some
unanticipated source may justify missing or chang-
ing a previously announced inflation target” (p. 35).
In our view, this conclusion puts BLMP squarely 
in the LET camp. Mishkin (2002) makes similar
arguments.
One might hope that empirical evidence would
resolve this debate. The problem is that the distinc-
tion regards trade-offs along the efficient policy
frontier. Informally, the LET view suggests that at
the optimum the only way to reduce inflation vari-
ance is to raise gap variance. The NET view is that,
in the face of our profound ignorance, our best guess
is that any deviation from the policy of smoothing
inflation will increase both inflation and output
variance. That is, policy injects variance into the
economy with no expected benefit. Both sides agree
that many of the significant policy changes we find
in the data are movements toward the efficient
frontier. Such moves may result in improvements
in all aspects of performance.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider
economies that have all the features of macro com-
mon ground and that are consistent with the LET
view. Thus, much of our analysis will be of limited
relevance for NETers.
4. DOES THE COMMUNICATION POLICY
OF THE ITF MAXIMIZE PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDING?
In this section, we begin our assessment of the
ITF with the simplest case. We set aside political-
economy problems and maintain the view that
nothing in the ITF constrains the central bank from
implementing the social optimum. Thus, there is no
question of whether the ITF delivers good policy.
That issue aside, the only remaining question is
whether the communication policy of the ITF con-
stitutes a good implementation of transparency.
Our core requirements of the ITF give no details
about how transparency is to be achieved, so this
section also begins our filling in of the details of
the ITF. We begin by presenting some arguments in
favor of transparency, or as we put it, maximizing
public understanding.
4.1 Why Maximize Public Understanding?
In the recent past, few central banks would have
placed heavy emphasis on maximizing public under-
standing. Moreover, there is no general presumption
that increasing common knowledge in society
improves welfare. The transparency literature is rife
with examples where this is not the case, for exam-
ple, Faust and Svensson (2001). Indeed, much of
the transparency literature can be viewed as a study
of when it is and is not optimal for the central bank
to surprise the public deliberately. This conven-
tional transparency literature does not address
three arguments in favor of clear communication
that are stressed by ITF advocates and many other
commentators.
First, as Greenspan (2002, p. 6) states, “Openness
is an obligation of a central bank in a free and demo-
cratic society.” A great many conservative and liberal
economists have supported this view. Deliberately
surprising the public, even for its own good, is not
the proper role of a central bank, in this view.
The second reason for clarity is that, as Lucas
makes clear, what constitutes optimal policy is
inextricably linked with public expectations about
policy. The effects of a given policy action are not
even defined without a treatment of policy expec-
tations. More recently, discussions of the liquidity
trap have reminded us of this point. The liquidity
trap case drives the point home because, under
certain assumptions, expanding the monetary base
13 Included are models with explicit microeconomic foundations, such
as the one used by Aoki (2001).
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in a liquidity trap has no direct effects on the
economy.14 Any effects result from changes in
expectations.
Lucas argues that, even away from the liquidity
trap, both the agent’s problem and the central bank’s
problem in practice are intractable unless the public
understands what the central bank is doing. An
assumption about public understanding of the future
course of policy is a precondition for coherent analy-
sis of current policy.15
Accepting the role of expectations in the econ-
omy does not imply that central bank communica-
tion is important. Instead, Friedman and Lucas both
argued for very simple policies that would largely
obviate the need for communication. It is when we
accept the view that best-practice cannot at this time
be codified in a simply communicable way that con-
tinuing central bank explanation of actions becomes
essential.
The third argument in favor of clear communi-
cation is that it may alter incentives in a beneficial
way. Many variations of this idea have been studied
in the political-economy literature. We argue that ITF
advocates have a new channel in mind. This section
focuses mainly on more direct benefits of clear
communication; incentive effects are dealt with in
section 6.
It is useful to note that none of these three 
reasons for clear communication has received much
emphasis in the transparency literature. These may
be the most important reasons for transparency in
practice, however.
4.2 Our Approach and Model
Analyzing communication policy is complicated
by the interaction between how policy is conducted
and how it is communicated. If communication
policy actually matters, then there is an interaction
between what one should do and what one should
say. Here we cut this knot by constructing an exam-
ple in which we can unambiguously determine
what one should do. In particular, we examine a
simple model solved under the standard rational-
expectations assumption that all agents fully under-
stand the model and policy. We give the central bank
the commitment technology to solve any political-
economy problems. In this case, the socially optimal
policy is unambiguous.
We then assess whether the ITF communication
policy provides the most effective way to describe
the conduct of policy. If we added an uninformed
agent to the economy, would the ITF communication
policy be the best approach to bringing that agent
up to speed?
The model we employ has many standard fea-
tures, and models like it have been used by support-
ers of the ITF, for example, Svensson (1997a). While
it is exceedingly simple, it embodies the common
ground described above. In our view, adding the
complexity of reality would only tend to magnify
the importance of the points we emphasize.
The model starts with the policymaker’s loss
function, which is the standard expected discounted
sum of period losses conditional on available
information:
(1)
where εt is the operator giving expectations condi-
tional on time t information, ,t+j is the period loss
at time t+j, and 0<β<1 is the policymaker’s dis-
count factor. The symbols yt+j and πt+j represent the
logarithms of output and gross inflation, respectively;
π* is the bliss value for inflation; y
P is flexible-price
output, which we refer to as potential output; and
y*=y
P+κ is the bliss level of output. We set κ ≠ 0
as in the time-consistency literature to allow for the
fact that the central bank may aim for output above
potential due to political pressure or for some reason
associated with economic distortions. The output
gap is defined as actual output minus potential
(yt+j – y
P).
The policymaker minimizes the loss function
subject to the Phillips curve,16
(2)
where π – is the unconditional mean of inflation.
Deviations of inflation from its unconditional mean
at time t+j depend positively on both past and
ππ φ π π φ β π π
αε




































16 Using Phillips curves that include both lagged and expected future
inflation is common practice; the exact specification in equation (2)
is used in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999). One way of arriving at this
Phillips curve (2) is to assume that inflation rates are set in Calvo-type
contracts and that the inflation rates of agents who do not get to reset
prices in the current period are indexed to the unconditional mean
of inflation.
14 For one discussion of the liquidity trap situation and references to
many more, see Clouse et al. (2003).
15 A recent confirmation that central bank talk matters is provided by
Kohn and Sack (2003).
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expected future deviations, the output gap, and an
i.i.d. normal cost shock, εt. The symbol xt+j|t repre-
sents the expected value of x at time t+j conditional
on information available at time t.
The Phillips curve, (2), reflects two features of the
common ground. First, there is no trade-off between
mean inflation and any other mean or variance.17
This feature implies that the mean inflation rate can
be set independent of other considerations in the
model. In a more realistic model, there might be a
link between, say, the mean and variance of inflation,
but so long as the relation is generally positive this
does not change the argument that low inflation can
be chosen without regard to other goals.18
Second, there is a short-run trade-off between
inflation and the output gap, and as we shall see,
this trade-off is exploitable. The trade-off could be
made fuzzier in various ways, but doing so would
not alter the implications we emphasize.
4.3 Optimal Policy in a Backward-
Looking Version
We use two special cases of the model to illus-
trate different features of interest.19 Here, we con-
sider a backward-looking version of the model in
which there is no wedge between potential and
desired output (κ=0) and current inflation depends
on lagged inflation but not on expected future infla-
tion (φ=1). Under these assumptions, the model
generates no inflation bias and, under optimal com-




where the parameter Λ is defined in the appendix.
These processes have the following implications
that we will use in our discussion:
yy tj
P














+ −= − () +< < Λ ΛΛ 1 01 ,
1. Both inflation and the output gap are 
covariance-stationary, Gaussian time-series
processes.
2. The unconditional expectation of inflation is
the target value, επt+j=π*.
3. Conditional inflation expectations are
described by πt+j|t=π*+Λ
j(πt – π*).
4. There is an optimal balancing of output gap
and inflation variance.
Implications like these are very general given the
features of the common ground and the LET view.
4.4 Strengths of the ITF Communication
Framework: Transparency and Anchoring
Under the assumption that the central bank
implements the socially optimal policy as we have
derived it, we can now ask whether several usual
features of the ITF represent an effective way to
communicate best-practice. As stated in the intro-
duction, the first goal of best-practice is to get mean
inflation right. In the model, we have that 
(5)
so it is clearly appropriate to announce a long-run
inflation target. Explanation of the behavior of infla-
tion relative to the target is the centerpiece of ITF
communication policy. A primary objective of the
ITF is to anchor long-run inflation expectations, and
the policy leaves little room for misunderstanding
this objective. Thus, the ITF communication policy
is arguably extremely successful in communicating
about the first goal of monetary policy.
4.5 Room for Improvement:
The Balance of Multiple Goals
In this section, we argue that the primary short-
coming of the ITF communication policy is that it
does not explain clearly the roles and balance of
multiple goals. Indeed, we argue that the ITF as
implemented often involves elements that are lit-
erally inconsistent with best-practice policy and, in
any case, obfuscates some basic issues.
To begin discussion, we list some usual features
of the framework that we find problematic. It is
often a feature of the ITF, as advocated and practiced,
that one or more fixed horizons are associated with
the inflation target. This practice is literally incon-
sistent with optimization. For example, the results









17 This property can be confirmed by taking the unconditional expecta-
tion of the Phillips curve.
18 Of course, there could be conflict among various low rates, as the
bliss points for the mean and variance need not coincide.
19 Analyzing the general model might be nicer in some respects, but
would be unduly complicated given our very limited ambitions. Both
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Svensson (2003) consider backward-
and forward-looking versions separately.  
20 All derivations are in the appendix.
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(6)
with probability 1, and that with certainty we will
face times, t, at which,
(7)
for any ε. That is, under best-practice, there will be
times when the expectation of inflation at any
horizon remains far from any target or target range.
Choosing a fixed horizon at which the inflation
forecast must be consistent with the target in some
sense can be thought of as an approximation to
optimization. In particular, under full optimization
we can pick a horizon h, a small probability ε, and
a margin of error θ such that
(8)
That is, at the horizon h, the forecast of inflation is
in a small neighborhood of π* most of the time. Thus,
choosing a fixed horizon for meeting the inflation
target seems like a sensible approximation. We take
up the costs and benefits of approximation in the
next section. For now, we note that choosing a fixed
horizon is not an accurate description of fully opti-
mal policy.
Some central banks state target ranges for infla-
tion. It is not clear how to interpret these ranges.
Does a central bank aim to be inside its announced
range all the time? Under best-practice, should it?
In our example, there is an interpretation of
the term “target range” that is consistent with best-
practice. As is clear from equation (8), the central
bank can view the target range as a confidence inter-
val and relate the width of the range to the proba-
bility that inflation (or its forecast at the relevant
horizon) will be in the range.21 Under this interpre-
tation, a target range is purely descriptive in that it
states that inflation will be within the range π*±θ
most of the time. This interpretation of the target
range is subtle, and we suspect not the predominant
one.
There is a contrasting interpretation that is not
consistent with best-practice. Under this interpre-
tation, the central bank wants inflation to be inside
the range at all times, but control errors might cause
it to wander out at times. This interpretation is not
consistent with best-practice in the example. There
is no control error in our example—if there were,
pr( ) pr( ) . | | || ππ θππ θε th t th t +
∗
+
∗ −< = ∈ ± = − 1
|| | ππ ε tj t j +
∗ −> > ≥   00
ππ tj t j +
∗ ≠≥ | 0 the θassociated with a given εwould be larger. Under
best-practice, the central bank deliberately sets
inflation outside any given interval at times. When
evaluating policy, no incident of inflation crossing
the boundary is evidence of central bank misbehav-
ior; only excessive frequency of being outside the
interval constitutes such evidence.
A key test as to whether the range is properly
understood as a confidence interval is that under
best-practice excessive frequency of being inside
the range is also evidence of misbehavior. It should
seem equally natural to punish the central bank for
being inside the range too often as for being outside
the range. In the LET view, no matter how limited
one thinks the limited exploitability is, it remains
the case that excessive smoothness and excessive
volatility of inflation are equally costly at the margin
in equilibrium. As BLMP document, some of the
problems with target ranges we are pointing to have
been observed in practice.
Next we note that the long-run inflation goal is
often said to be preeminent in some sense in the ITF
framework.22 While the intention here may seem
clear enough, we do not understand what it means
formally.
Given the common ground we are accepting, it
is true that there is no trade-off between setting the
mean of inflation at π* and any other goal of policy.
There is no long-run trade-off; the mean of inflation
has no implications for other choices. Thus, the same
policy is obtained if inflation is the preeminent long-
run goal or if setting the gap equal to zero is the
preeminent long-run goal.
Most crucially, we can arbitrarily rank the pre-
eminence of long-run goals only if we are talking
strictly about the mean of inflation. Generally, the
preeminence statement is linked in some way to
price stability. To the extent that stability is inter-
preted in a natural way as having something to do
with the variability of prices and inflation, any state-
ment of preeminence is the antithesis of the key
feature of optimal policy—the notion that optimiza-
tion implies an optimal marginal rate of exchange
between stability of prices and stability of the gap.
22 For example, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s 2002 Policy Targets
Agreement states that “[i]n pursuing its price stability objective, the
Bank shall seek to avoid unnecessary instability in output, interest rates
and the exchange rate.” The Bank of England Act charges the bank
“(a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the
economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives
for growth and employment.” There is similar language for the Swedish
National Bank, as confirmed by Heikensten and Vredin (2002).
21 The central bank can choose a probability, ε, and derive the width of
the range, θ, or pick a width and derive the probability.
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Here is the essence of our argument so far.
Monetary policy in the LET view involves conflicting
goals. The mean inflation goal may reside outside
this conflict, but any discussion of stability of prices
or inflation must inevitably raise issues of other goals.
We argue that several aspects of the ITF as practiced
do not provide a natural and straightforward frame-
work for communicating this fact. We now consider
various ways other goals are accommodated.
One approach to balancing multiple goals is to
state a target range for inflation that is assumed to
give the central bank wiggle room to consider other
goals. In practice, things have arguably worked this
way. We return to the primary question of this sec-
tion: Is wiggle room the most effective way to com-
municate optimization with multiple conflicting
goals? In our view, this way of communicating can
clearly work, but is not the height of pedagogy.23
Escape clauses are another alternative. Every
framework will surely need the equivalent of escape
clauses. There will be events sufficiently peculiar
from the standpoint of what was foreseeable at the
time the framework was conceived that briefly
abandoning the framework will be necessary. Still,
taking account of the role of other goals through
escape clauses is surely not fully transparent.
Finally, Svensson (1997a) has argued that in a
quadratic optimization framework like the one in
our simple example, we can view optimal policy as
targeting the forecast of inflation, with consideration
of the gap incorporated by allowing it to affect the
horizon at which one wants the forecast to hit the
target. Mishkin (2002) argues for this approach
and some ITF banks use this sort of rhetoric. This
approach is consistent with optimization. Formally,
it will be true under optimal policy that at each point
in time, t, there is a shortest horizon, h, such that
(9)
for a given θ. Thus, in each period an h could be
announced.
If we were teaching this optimization process
to an undergraduate or to the marginal agent added
to the model, is this the most natural way? We have
a linear-quadratic optimization with two conflicting
goals and one instrument. The two goals of optimiza-
tion are to get the mean right and to balance vari-
|| | ππ θ th t +
∗ −<
ability of inflation against variability of the gap. It
seems strained, at best, to describe the optimization
process in terms of a target for one variable and
adjusting the horizon to take account of the other.
This description fundamentally obfuscates the
trade-off in question.
In this section, we have tried to make a simple
point that many people find obvious. The ITF
communication policy is tilted heavily toward
emphasis on stabilizing inflation. Several usual
features give inflation a role that is literally incon-
sistent with optimization in the LET perspective.
Thus, in our view the communication policy of the
ITF is not the best-practice way of maximizing
public understanding.
5. SIMPLIFICATION AND 
APPROXIMATION
We have followed major advocates in interpreting
the ITF as allowing the central bank to follow the
socially optimal policy. Using this interpretation in
a conventional LET-view model, we find that a dis-
sonance arises between policy and the standard
communication approach followed by the ITF. Per-
haps we are being too literal: It may be that policy,
or the communication of policy, is deliberately
intended to be some sort of approximation of opti-
mal behavior. These simplifications may be opti-
mal in some broader perspective: Perhaps there is
some unmodeled simplicity constraint on either
communication or policy itself that we have not
captured. At some level, there surely are such con-
straints, so this possibility deserves serious treatment.
5.1 Simplicity-Constrained Policy
Perhaps policy behavior is subject to a simplicity
constraint that causes policymakers to follow rule-
of-thumb-like policy. From where would such a
constraint arise? The standard justification is that it
arises from some need for ease of monitoring. Thus,
a bank with a severe credibility problem might find
that the credibility benefits of a rule that is trivial
to monitor outweigh the costs. Fixed exchange rates
are often justified in this way both in theory and
practice (Atkeson and Kehoe, 2002).24 The arguments
24 We are dealing here with the case in which the simplicity constraint
binds in the sense that the central bank deviates from the policy that
is best on standard macro-stabilization grounds. Thus, we are distin-
guishing this case from the one in which simple rules are best, even
from a pure stabilization standpoint. For example, Friedman argued
that a k percent rule is optimal due to our profound ignorance. Others
have argued that simple rules may be optimal, or nearly so, from the
standpoint of robustness (Levin and Williams, 2003).
23 Faust and Svensson (2001) present an example in which inflation
fluctuates narrowly around the optimum value, but due to lack of
transparency about the nature of other goals the economy is signifi-
cantly more volatile than under full transparency.
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for a simplicity constraint in extreme cases are
familiar.
Regarding the advanced economies that are
the focus here, we make two points. First, if the ITF
requires deviating from the optimal policy on econ-
omic grounds, then proper evaluation of the ITF
requires a clear statement of the deviations required.
In this case, we need to go back to the macromodel
horse races to evaluate the costs of the deviations
and attempt to weigh these costs against the benefits
of simplicity. Second, as we argue next, even when
banks assert that policy is constrained in this way, it




We have generally treated the problematic ele-
ments of the ITF as constraining communication,
not policy behavior. In practice, public communi-
cation requires some simplification, and as econo-
mists, we naturally think of simplification in terms
of an approximation that is adequate so long as
variables stay near some mean or steady-state values.
The problems with ITF communication listed above
will probably be minor so long as inflation and the
gap stay near the steady-state values.
We believe that use of a communication policy
simplified in this way is dangerous. As we get further
from the steady state, the appropriateness of the
simplified framework diminishes. Of course, since
these conditions are observed infrequently, uncer-
tainty on the part of the public about the central
bank’s policy is greatest at these times. Further, the
conflict in society over the proper short-run policy
becomes more intense as we move away from the
steady state.25 Thus, the simplified communication
works best when it is least needed and tends to break
down when it is most needed.
If any ITF banks are following this course, they
are on a well-trodden path. Central banks have
regularly adopted rule-of-thumb communication
devices that function well during normal times and
then scrambled to wean the public from these rules
(or adjust and qualify the rules) when times became
more challenging.
Intermediate money targeting illustrates this
claim. It provided a framework for the conduct and
communication of policy. Although it was not nec-
essarily presented this way at the outset, intermediate
targeting was a simplifying approach that was viewed
as ex ante suboptimal on stabilization grounds.26
Under such a system, there inevitably comes a time
when the best judgments about how to run policy
conflict with the direction dictated by the interme-
diate target.
The central bank must then choose between
running policy it believes to be suboptimal or running
policy inconsistent with the framework it typically
uses in communication. In practice, banks generally
chose the latter option. Thus, the Fed regularly
redefined the target, redefined the target variable,
and simply ignored the deviation of the target vari-
able from target. Similarly, some have argued that
the Bundesbank was an implicit inflation targeter
and ignored the intermediate money target when it
appeared inconsistent with inflation objectives.27
We are not at all critical of this solution: These banks
probably made the right choice in deviating from
the communication policy rather than from best
policy.
This case illustrates that adopting simplified
communication approaches need not actually sim-
plify anything.28 Such communication works fine
in easy times. In challenging times, a dissonance
arises between the simple communication frame-
work and the course of policy, generating a certain
degree of turmoil and confusion.
5.3 Must the Public Have a Simple
Yardstick?
One virtue of the problematic ITF features that
we discuss is that they give the public a simple yard-
stick by which to judge policy. Given lexicographic
preferences over inflation and other goals, an infla-
tion target range, and a fixed horizon, inflation tar-
geting becomes very easy to monitor. One simply
checks whether the inflation forecast is at the target
at the specified horizon.
26 Intermediate targeting is inherently suboptimal so long as the word
intermediate is not superfluous. Svensson (1999) has derived the
conditions under which an intermediate target is “ideal,” and this, by
definition, is when there is no (observable implication of the) distinction
between the intermediate and ultimate goal. When intermediate money
targeting was adopted, no one claimed that money was “ideal.”
27 See, for example, Svensson (1999) and Romer and Romer (2000).
28 The Fed’s recent experience with the bias in the directive arguably
provides another example.
25 For example, for the quadratic loss function used in the model, 
∂(πt – π*)
2/∂πt and ∂(yt – y
P)
2/∂πt both rise as πt and yt move from the
steady state.
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The virtue of this yardstick is ease of use; the
problem is that it is the wrong yardstick. From
Heikensten and Vredin (2002), it seems that the
Swedish National Bank (hereafter Riksbank) may
have come closest to explicitly advocating that the
public think of policy using such a simple rule of
thumb. Recently policy pursued by the bank has
deviated from this rule of thumb, perhaps illustrating
to some extent the sort of communication problem
we raise.29
Despite such examples, it is explicit or implicit in
many discussions that ease of monitoring demands
that the public be given a yardstick for measuring
policy that is relatively straightforward to use. We
believe that Fed policy over the past 15 years provides
a counterexample. Arguably, one of the most notable
aspects of Federal Reserve policy in the Greenspan
era has been the fact that the Fed has resisted the
temptation to characterize policy in terms of some
simplified, and thereby inherently suboptimal,
framework. The Fed has demonstrated that one can
run policy with at least reasonable success without
placing constraints on policy or communication
that are thought ex ante to be suboptimal on econ-
omic grounds.
The Fed’s approach in this period is at times
viewed with alarm and/or suspicion. Svensson (2003)
argues that failure to adopt the ITF is a smokescreen
that allows the FOMC freedom to secretly change
its goals. Others argue that a concrete goal is essen-
tial for accountability.
These arguments may be correct, but they have
been selectively applied. The second major goal of
policy in the LET view is stabilizing the gap. It has
become conventional wisdom that the gap is suffi-
ciently difficult to measure and that communicating
a concrete goal for any particular measure of the
gap would be problematic. This view is taken as
adequate justification for not reporting a concrete
goal for a gap measure. Let us set aside for a moment
the factual question of whether difficulties in meas-
uring the gap are different in kind or only in degree
from those in measuring inflation.
Even acknowledging measurement problems,
one must surely echo Svensson in asking whether
these problems might be used as a smokescreen,
allowing a central bank to shift its preferences
about output stabilization.30 Further, one must ask
how the central bank could possibly attain credibility
and accountability on the gap goals without a con-
crete gap goal. These issues are no less pressing in
the case of real stability than in the case of inflation
stability.
In practice, we suspect that ITF advocates are
comfortable with the view that credibility and
accountability regarding real stability responsibilities
can be attained through vigorous central bank com-
munication. By the same token, we argue that it is,
at the very least, an open question whether account-
ability and credibility regarding inflation necessitate
adopting a simple yardstick that is suboptimal in
the sense we have been describing.
6. POLITICAL-ECONOMY PROBLEMS
AND THE ITF COMMUNICATION 
POLICY
ITF advocates contend that central bank com-
munication can solve political-economy problems.
In our view, this is the least well-analyzed claim of
ITF advocates. In this section we describe the com-
munication channel emphasized by ITFers and show
how existing tools can be employed to analyze it.
We ultimately conclude that use of this channel can
play a role in getting the mean of inflation right, but
seems as likely to complicate as to facilitate achieving
the appropriate balance between inflation and out-
put stability.
6.1 The Communication Channel
The basic idea behind the ITF communication
channel is that people dislike exposure of their
intentional trickery, honest mistakes, or incompe-
tence. If this is so, then public promises carry their
own enforcement mechanism based on policymaker
aversion to criticism. The ITF is designed to make
better use of this channel by requiring public state-
ment of goals and then public reports about progress
on the goals. As BLMP (p. 25) argue,
To the extent that the central bank governors
dislike admitting publicly that they may miss
their long-run inflation targets (or, alterna-
tively, to the extent that they dislike having
their inflation projections criticized as biased
or manipulated), the existence of an inflation-
targeting framework provides an incentive
for the central bank to limit its short-run
opportunism.
29 For a discussion of the Riksbank’s policy during this period, see
Sveriges Riksbank (2003).
30 Faust and Svensson (2001) show that even modest variations in this
regard can be costly.
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Svensson (1999, p. 663) is more emphatic:
I believe it fair to say that never before in
monetary history has an incentive system
been set up with such strong incentives for
optimal monetary policy decisions.
In more formal terms, the communication
channel invokes terms in the central banker loss
function—associated with, say, honesty and aversion
to criticism—that have often been ignored.31
The ITFers’ argument here seems consonant
with two alternative views about political-economy
problems. Blinder (1998) and McCallum (1997) argue
that the time-consistency literature simply misses
the point. According to McCallum, knowing about
the commitment policy, central bankers would “just
do it.” The ITF communication policy might be seen
as an attempt to increase the probability of this out-
come. Friedman has a different take on central
bankers’ loss functions:
From revealed preference [as revealed in
central bank communication], I suspect that
by far and away the two most important
variables in their [Federal Reserve policy-
makers’] loss function are avoiding account-
ability on the one hand and achieving public
prestige on the other. (quoted in Fischer,
1990, footnote 52)
Whether or not one subscribes to such an
uncomplimentary view, why not design a framework
to constructively exploit motives such as a desire
for prestige?
We readily accept the ITF premise that the threat
of public criticism affects the incentives of the central
bank and thereby the course of policy. We take the
view (perhaps following Blinder and McCallum) that,
in normal times and with first-rate policymakers,
this channel may not be of great importance. These
policymakers will “just do” the right thing, as they
see it, largely independent of public accolade or
criticism. In the spirit of preparing the roof for rainy
days, however, we consider the case when a weaker
or more political board is in place.
6.2 Solving Political-Economy Problems
Using Special Loss Functions
The communication channel involves terms in
the loss function representing aversion to criticism
that are usually neglected. Fortunately, the literature
provides tools for studying solutions to political-
economy problems using special loss functions.
Rogoff (1985) considers simply picking a “conserva-
tive” central banker, one with a loss function that
embodies greater aversion to inflation than the true
social loss function. This approach generates a
trade-off: Excess aversion to inflation lowers mean
inflation, but it causes inflation to be smoother and
the output gap to be more variable than is optimal.
Melitz (1988) and Obstfeld (1996) make use of terms
in the loss function embodying “political costs”
associated with breaking a pledge to keep the
exchange rate fixed. They, too, generate a trade-off
between reducing inflation bias and achieving sta-
bilization objectives. Calling attention to this possible
trade-off is one of the main contributions of the time-
consistency literature.32 Canzoneri, Nolan, and Yates
(1997) provide examples in which taking advantage
of “political cost” terms generates more complicated
trade-offs. These papers all consider intuitively
appealing, but ad hoc, loss functions.
In contrast, Walsh (1995) and Persson and
Tabellini (1993) show how one can derive a loss func-
tion that completely eliminates the inflation bias
problem without introducing stabilization costs. They
discuss how this structure of loss might be induced
using performance contracts for policymakers.
More recently, Lockwood, Miller, and Zhang (1995),
Svensson (1997b), and Svensson and Woodford
(forthcoming) construct loss functions that eliminate
both inflation and stabilization biases in models
like ours. The basic approach in all these studies is
to amend the policymaker loss function in such a
way that the implied first-order conditions under
discretion give rise to the same policy as under
commitment.
32 Canzoneri (1985) also calls attention to such a trade-off. In his paper,
the trade-off arises because of the imposition of an additional constraint
on the policymaker, a requirement to achieve an average value for the
money supply, not because of a special policymaker loss function.
31 The conventional literature has examined several channels through
which talk by the central bank could alter equilibrium outcomes. For
example, it could lead to the cheap-talk equilibrium of Stein (1989),
facilitate coordination on the best of the many equilibria of a monetary
policy game as shown by Barro and Gordon (1983), or beneficially
expand the set of equilibria as illustrated by Atkeson and Kehoe (2002).
ITF advocates have in mind something much simpler—although for-
malization could involve elements like those discussed above. The
communication channel as described here has a family resemblance
to what Barro and Gordon called reputational equilibria in which the
public might raise its expectation of future inflation in order to “punish”
the misdeeds of the central bank. Technically, the important distinctions
here are that the disutility from the punishment falls directly on the
central bankers, involves no costs to the public, and is automatically
attached to failure to deliver on “promises.”
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6.3 A Formal Example
Here we use a forward-looking version of our
simple model to illustrate how amending the loss
function can eliminate inflation bias and stabiliza-
tion bias. In this version, we assume that current
inflation depends on expected future, but not lagged,
inflation (φ=0) and that target output exceeds poten-
tial (κ >0). For simplicity, we assume that there is a
single random shock in period t (εt ≠ 0, εj=0, j ≠ t).
Under commitment, the policymaker can affect
inflation at t and expected inflation in all future
periods. Therefore, it can smooth adjustment to the
shock over multiple periods. In future periods, the
policymaker has an incentive to renege but is locked
in by commitment. However, under discretion, when
the shock hits at t, the policymaker cannot have the
desired effect on inflation expectations in future
periods because it cannot be relied upon to ratify
those expectations. Therefore, inflation returns to
its unconditional mean in period t+1 and remains
there, so adjustment to the shock is smoothed less
effectively. The formal solutions are presented in
Table 1.33 The commitment policy we consider is
commonly referred to as the full-commitment policy
(or the solution to the Ramsey problem): It is the
unconstrained optimum given that the policymaker
can commit to the chosen policy.
Our model exhibits the classic inflation bias
under discretion. Ignoring any shocks, at the opti-
mum inflation rate of π*, the bank has an incentive
to surprise the public by increasing inflation in an
attempt to stimulate output. Inflation is increased
to the point at which the marginal cost of additional
inflation just offsets the marginal benefit of attempt-
ing to raise output above potential toward the target.
To see the inflation bias in this case, set εt equal to
zero in the discretion solutions in equations (T1.1)
and (T1.2) and assume that κ >0. Under discretion,
inflation is constant and exceeds π* by the standard
inflation bias, λκ/α.
In contrast, under commitment, inflation is time
varying. It approaches π* from above and is always
less than the positive inflation under discretion.
Output is also time varying. It approaches y
P from
above and is always below y*. It is optimal to have
inflation above π*in order to raise output above y
P
for all finite j, but optimal inflation and output
must decline over time in order to be consistent
with the Phillips curve.
The model also exhibits stabilization bias under
discretion. A useful measure of stabilization bias is
the part of the extra loss from discretion relative to
commitment that results from the existence of the
shock. To consider stabilization bias, set κ equal to
zero in all the solutions in Table 1 and assume that
there is a positive cost shock in period t (εt>0) and
no shock in any other period. As might be expected,
under discretion the optimal response to the cost
shock in period t involves some increase in inflation
and some reduction in output in period t and no
response in any later period because there are no
shocks then.
Under commitment, the optimal responses of
inflation and output in period t are damped relative
to those under discretion. There are reductions in
both inflation and output in period t+1 and in every
period thereafter, with the responses approaching
zero from below as j approaches infinity, in order
to be consistent with the Phillips curve. The Phillips
curve in period t implies that reducing inflation in
period t+1 partially offsets the upward pressure
on inflation resulting from the shock. Therefore, it
is possible to damp the responses of both inflation
and output in period t. The benefit in period t more
than offsets the losses in all future periods because,
with a quadratic loss function, the first small move-
ments away from the optimum in future periods
cause negligible increases in loss.
We can attain the full-commitment solution
under discretion if the policymaker is given the
amended loss function
(10)
Loosely speaking, one subtracts out terms in the
discretion first-order condition that lead to the
inflation bias and adds in terms relating to the time-
varying and state-contingent optimal policy. In par-
ticular, stabilization bias can be eliminated only by
subtracting terms that are time varying and depend




















































































33 As before, all derivations are in the appendix.
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Faust and Henderson
JULY/AUGUST 2004      131
6.4 Likely Effectiveness of the
Communication Channel
Our example illustrates how political-economy
problems can be avoided if only the policymaker’s
loss function differs from the social loss function
in the proper way. It also shows that, even in a
stripped down model, the required special terms
are somewhat complicated and vary with the state
of the economy. In this very simple model, we might,
however, imagine writing an incentive contract to
achieve optimality. Of course, it is a feature of the
common ground that the actual economy is so com-
plicated that it is impossible to codify such a contract.
ITFers argue that we can achieve much of the
desired effect by exploiting policymaker aversion
to criticism. However, to achieve this effect on the
first-order conditions, these aversion-to-criticism
terms would have to take a very particular, state-
dependent form. We have seen no argument as to
why aversion to criticism would work in the intended
manner. Indeed, we have difficulty imagining how
to form such an argument.
More generally, we know of no literature sup-
porting the view that some combination of public
promises, maximal scrutiny, and the threat of public
criticism is an uncontroversial recipe for optimal
public policy. Suppose we accept that weak policy-
makers will be swayed by criticism. Given the skew-
ing of communication in the ITF, it strikes us that a
weak policymaker may find it safest to excessively
smooth inflation. That is, it might literally follow its
pronouncements. Both this view and the contrary
view, however, are highly speculative given the
nature of the mechanism.
Despite our reticence to draw strong conclusions
either way, we offer two comments. First, we find it
plausible that stating a long-run inflation goal and
communicating regularly about it will raise the
chance that policy hits the long-run goal for the
reasons cited by the ITF. Second, the ITF seems as
likely to complicate as to facilitate achieving a proper
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7. COMPLICATING FACTORS LARGELY
MISSING FROM MODELS
Up to now, we have been analyzing the ITF from
a relatively abstract perspective. As preparation for
making some constructive suggestions based on our
analysis, we discuss some real-world complications
that are largely missing from our analysis and most
other formal work.
7.1 Strategic Skewing and Transparency
Beyond clarity, strategic skewing may be an
essential component of effective public communi-
cation. One of the most famous principles of strategic
skewing in the folk wisdom of central banking is that
central banks should “do what they do, but only
talk about inflation.” Alan Blinder contravened this
principle, the story goes, in the famous Jackson Hole
imbroglio, perhaps confirming its wisdom.
While most ITF advocates would vigorously
dispute it, the ITF might be viewed as an application
of this folk wisdom. Without the folk wisdom, it is
difficult to imagine why a policy of optimization with
multiple conflicting goals would be called “inflation
targeting.” Calling reports on all aspects of policy
“inflation reports” is an analogous misnomer. The
folk wisdom would also justify discussing goals
other than inflation only as they affect the horizon
over which one intends to hit the inflation target.
The folk wisdom might actually be wisdom. If
these topics are too sensitive to discuss, then we
should stop praising the ITF and other central banks
for their commitment to transparency; instead we
should lament the fact that central banks cannot
publicly discuss the pursuit of their multiple man-
dates. Further, the practical art of strategic skew-
ing is well-studied, for example, by public relations
experts. Economists have no special claim to
expertise in optimal skewing.
7.2 Maximal Transparency and
Deliberation
Unlimited transparency may be inconsistent
with optimal deliberation. As Greenspan (2002, p. 5)
puts it
The undeniable, though regrettable, fact is
that the most effective policymaking is done
outside the immediate glare of the press.
More generally, transparency could, depending on
the social environment, generate inefficient dissen-
sion about policy. Goodfriend (1986) lays out various
forms of this argument including the following:
In this view, secrecy could confer a social
benefit because it makes consensus politics
work more smoothly and with less cost.
The role of concerns like this in determining the
current structure of the Federal Reserve is reviewed
in Faust (1996).
We think it is almost certainly a grave error to
trivialize such concerns. We cannot contribute much
to their analysis, however. In our view proper treat-
ment requires bringing in expertise from areas
beyond economics. We stick to reviewing the more
directly economic merits of transparency.
7.3 Multiple Decisionmakers
In many countries a board is charged with
making policy. In much of the theory we have been
reviewing, the fact of multiple decisionmakers is
inessential. The framers of the Federal Reserve, how-
ever, saw the composition of the board as an essen-
tial aspect of their response to political-economy
problems. For example, Warburg (1930, p. 773)
argues that a
formula had to be found by means of which
these two elements [big business and politi-
cians] would be called upon to balance one
another.
As is often the case with responses to difficult
political design problems, the framers came up with
a mish-mash solution.34 As a bottom line, they
decided on a particular weighting of interests on
the FOMC. Congressman Henry Steagall (1935, 
p. 13706) summarized the result:
[U]nder the bill embodied in the conference
report the board [that is, the FOMC] will
stand 5 to 7 giving the people of the country,
as contradistinguished from private banking
interest, control by a vote of 7 to 5 instead
of by a vote of 3 to 2 [as proposed in the
Senate].
34 For example, there are 12 votes on the FOMC; five presidents vote; the
president of the New York Fed and either the Chicago or Cleveland Fed
president always vote. The Reserve Bank presidents are nominated
by the boards of their respective banks and confirmed by the Federal
Reserve Board. The nominating boards are composed of nine directors,
six chosen by district bankers (three representing district bankers and
three representing general district interests), and three chosen by the
Federal Reserve Board. The seven governors are nominated by the
President of the United States with due regard to a fair representation
of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests.
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Multiple heterogeneous policymakers clearly
pose a practical problem for transparent commu-
nication about the goals of policy, the rationale for
policy, and the causes of past policy mistakes and
successes. There seems to be disagreement about
the magnitude of this problem, however. Some con-
tend that there are not many differences of opinion
about either the appropriate loss function for policy
or about how the economy works. Others are not
so sanguine.
If there are substantial disagreements over the
loss function and/or the workings of the economy,
one response would be to require multi-stage deci-
sionmaking. First, the board agrees on goals of policy.
Next, taking the goals as given, the board agrees on
the model of the economy. Finally, the board makes
policy taking the goals and model as given.
This approach has the convenient feature of
making the policy process, for purposes of analysis,
look rather like the simple single-decisionmaker
problem. In some discussion, failure to agree first
on goals of policy or the model sometimes seems
to be taken as prima facia evidence of inefficient
behavior by the policymaking board. This view
trivializes the analysis of public decisionmaking.
There is no theorem of public decisionmaking
stating that the multistage decisionmaking approach
is good for society. One can write examples in which
multistage decisionmaking is or is not efficient, but
theoretical examples probably do not get to the heart
of the matter. Imagine a monetary policy board
populated by astute, public-spirited, policy-oriented
economists—epitomized perhaps by James Tobin
and Milton Friedman. The multistage approach
would require that they agree first on goals, next on
the model, and only then consider policy options,
given those goals and model. In an alternative
approach, we could simply charge them with agree-
ing on and implementing policy. One suspects that
the multistage approach may not even be feasible
in practice. There is at least room to differ regarding
which approach would lead to better policy.
7.4 Measurement of Inflation and the
Gap
Choosing a measure of inflation and an appro-
priate long-run inflation goal presents practical
problems that may not have been fully appreciated
during periods of high inflation. In 1980, any low
number seemed like a good thing. Fortunately, gone
are days when proponents of low inflation could
simply assert, “Zero is a nice round number.”
There is now general agreement that most, if
not all, price indices exhibit non-negligible quality
biases. Further, for various reasons to do with quality
bias and composition, different indices often behave
quite differently for substantial periods of time. Thus,
the issue of which index to focus on may be of
some importance.35
Many economists inside and outside the ITF
camp have also concluded that the inflation goal
should be set high enough to limit the probability
of hitting the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates. Thus, they argue for allowing a non-negligible
stabilization buffer that exceeds proposed allow-
ances for quality bias.36 Exactly how large a buffer
to allow is a technical question involving the costs
of moderate inflation, the costs of being mired in a
recession, and the responsiveness of the economy
to changes in the policy rate. The answer may change
over time as the economy changes.37 In our view,
the fact that choosing the appropriate target is a
technical question and the possibility that a good
initial answer may not be found argue strongly for
keeping the choice of the inflation target in the hands
of central banks and for revisiting it periodically.
Obviously, ITF banks believe that the benefits
of a concrete target outweigh any costs that might
be generated by these measurement issues. Some
current and past U.S. policymakers agree—for exam-
ple, Bernanke (BLMP) and Meyer (2002). Gramlich
(2003) speculates that announcing a long-run range
for inflation might increase transparency without
unduly limiting flexibility. In contrast, Greenspan
(2002, p. 6) argues that
For all these conceptual uncertainties and
measurement problems, a specific numerical
inflation target would represent an unhelpful
and false precision.
Greenspan argues, loosely speaking, that the
Fed is striving for price stability properly measured
and that achieving this goal does not correspond
reliably to hitting a long-run target for any particular
index. We do not attempt to resolve this empirical
dispute in this paper, but discuss some of its impli-
cations in the final section.
35 Recent discussion of the issues regarding changing the relevant
index in the United Kingdom (HM Treasury, 2003) and of the role of
energy prices in Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank, 2003) are a reminder
that the choice of price index can have important implications.
36 For a particularly eloquent statement of the case for a stabilization
buffer, see Phelps (1972, p. 210).
37 Henderson (2004) puts forward views similar to those expressed here.
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It is generally believed that the measurement
issues regarding the gap are much more serious.
Here, in discussing the real world, we are moving
beyond our model and using gap as a short-hand for
the relevant measure of economic slack. In practice,
there may be many relevant gaps, and none is easy
to measure. Indeed, one version of the NET view is
that these problems are so overwhelming that the
gap should not be part of policymaking.38
In the LET view, these measurement issues
may be immense and, hence, exploitability may be
minimal. By definition, however, the LETer believes
that we can monitor the economy sufficiently well
to attain some beneficial exploitation of the short-
run trade-off. If this is so, there is also some way to
communicate this information to the public. That
is, there should be a heavy presumption against the
view caricatured by Karl Brunner that central bank-
ing is an inaccessible art, and that the
esoteric nature of the art is moreover
revealed by an inherent impossibility to
articulate its insights in explicit and intelli-
gible words and sentences. (as quoted in
Goodfriend, 1986)
Arguably, to the extent that there is less contro-
versy regarding the measurement of inflation than
the gap, careful and thorough communication about
the gap is more essential. Under this view, the empha-
sis in the communication strategy of the ITF is
misplaced.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In section 2, we state that two core requirements
of the ITF are a long-run inflation target, and trans-
parency. The first only constrains central bank policy
in the long run; the second constrains talk, not
actions. Based on these requirements alone, it would
be difficult to understand the passionate debate
over the ITF.
In filling out the description of the ITF, we have
come to believe that some of the passion comes from
the following characterization. Inflation targeting
has been portrayed as a snug-fitting garment that is
a great improvement over pure discretion. The latter
is caricatured as a seat of the pants approach. Less
colorfully, inflation targeting is depicted as con-
strained discretion.39
From one perspective, this characterization is
quite reassuring. Purely discretionary, seat-of-the-
pants policymaking sounds a bit risky. Given that
monetary policy is made in a complicated world and
is subject to conflicting pressures in society over
what policy is best, there is rightfully something com-
forting about the notion of a snug-fitting garment.
From another perspective the characterization
is distressing. Central banks have often put on snug-
fitting garments—for example, fixed exchange rates
and money targeting. Historically, these garments
have proven uncomfortable; they have regularly
split at the seams.
Which perspective is correct? ITF advocates
tell us there is nothing to fear from the snug-fitting
garment: The constraints in constrained discretion
do not constrain the central bank from pursuing
optimal behavior. While there is nothing, in principle,
wrong with this claim,40 we remain uncertain about
the basis of this claim. Going beyond the core
requirements, in practice ITF imposes many require-
ments—for example, fixed horizons, target ranges,
lexicographic preferences regarding price stability.
These requirements might be viewed as constraining
policy, but they are inconsistent with optimization
under conventional views about the economy. We
have treated them not as constraints on policy behav-
ior, but merely as features of the ITF communication
policy that generate dissonance between how the
banks talk and how they act. We have not identified
requirements of the ITF that constrain use of policy-
making discretion, while remaining consistent with
optimization.
We acknowledge that, despite their costs, central
banks might find simple yardsticks or rules of thumb
useful in guiding the communication of and/or con-
duct of policy. It is an open question whether such
simplifications yield net benefits in any particular
context. Until such constraints are better justified,
they are not, in our view, clearly part of best-practice
monetary policy.
8.1 Constructive Suggestions
Our review of the ITF leads to several construc-
tive suggestions regarding best-practice, whether
inside or outside the ITF. In short form, these amount
to a guide for implementing the core requirements.
40 For example, “attain the social optimum” could be viewed as a con-
straint that imposes no costs. More generally, of course, constraints
on behavior off the desired equilibrium path have no cost of the sort
we are discussing and may help in selecting from among equilibria.
38 See, for example, Orphanides (2003a).
39 This characterization can be found in many places, including BLMP.
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Suggestion 1. Central banks should state a clear
long-run inflation goal. No range or fixed horizon
should be given.41 If no numeric target is given, clear
countervailing interests should be stated, and effort
should be made to reduce uncertainty regarding the
long-run goal. The value of this goal in meeting all
long-run goals of policy should be stressed.
In order to be consistent with this suggestion, ITF
central banks would have to modify the characteri-
zation of their long-run inflation goals in many cases.
The Fed regularly communicates its strong commit-
ment to the principle of price stability but has not
stated an explicit target. As justification for not stat-
ing an explicit target, various policymakers have
cited problems due to measurement issues, political-
economy considerations, and the existence of
multiple decisionmakers. A key question facing the
Fed is whether with careful statement and qualifica-
tion, it might obtain some of the benefits of a more
concrete goal while minimizing the costs.
Suggestion 2. Central banks should communi-
cate in a balanced way about the objectives driving
short-run policy. If these objectives are seen as con-
flicting due to the structure of the economy, this
viewpoint should be made clear. To the extent that
other goals are more difficult to quantify than the
inflation stability goal, the need for clear reporting
is heightened and banks should strive to find ways
to communicate about these goals effectively.
For ITF central banks, adopting suggestion 2
would involve changing some language that is liter-
ally inconsistent with optimization in the LET view.
It would also require providing more complete com-
munication about the role of goals other than infla-
tion in policy. It is a matter of perspective whether
these are viewed as small or large changes. They may
well be minor tweaks on the idealized ITF framework
defined by Svensson.
If transparency is truly a goal in central banking,
then the area with the greatest room left for improve-
ment at most central banks is communicating the
roles of goals other than inflation. For ITF banks
and others, it would greatly clarify issues if three
questions were answered: Is some notion of real
stability an objective of the central bank? Does the
bank take the NET or LET view? If it is a LETer, how
will the trade-off be managed? At a general level, ITF
central banks and others have done quite well in
answering the first of these questions but less well
in answering the latter two.
Answering the second question—are you a NETer
or LETer?—is relatively straightforward. Answering
the third question requires successfully characteriz-
ing how the trade-off will be managed. This is a
complex task that all LET central banks must face.
We have no special insights on this topic. We believe,
however, that clarity on goals and the NET/LET dis-
tinction is an important first step. It brings real stabil-
ity into the conversation in its proper role. The focus
on inflation has led to valuable innovation in com-
munication; putting real stability on the table can
promote similar innovation on the real side. The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of
Norway have begun this experimentation process.42
Suggestion 3. If best-practice policy is compli-
cated, the totality of central bank communication
should reflect that complexity.
This suggestion is based on the distinction
between two dictionary senses of transparent. The
first, and the one generally applied throughout the
central banking literature, is that transparent means
“frank, open, candid.” However, sometimes the idea
surfaces that central bank communication should
be transparent in the sense of being, “easily seen
through, recognized, [or] understood.”43 If best-
practice dictates complicated policy, then communi-
cation that is frank, open, and candid will probably
not be easily understood.
In practice, central banks probably need to
have a multi-layered approach to communication
with differing levels of complexity. However, there
should be readily available information that makes
it possible for a reasonably tenacious and intelligent
person to understand policy in its complexity.
A review of the material on the web sites of
several ITF banks suggests several useful examples
of this multi-layered approach. Setting aside our
particular criticisms about overemphasis of inflation,
the monetary policy reports of ITF banks represent
an extremely valuable aid in understanding the
function of policy. These banks generally commis-
sion and publish outside reviews of the reports; for
this and other reasons, their content is steadily
improving.
Assessing the communication of the Fed is more
difficult. It is certainly true that there is no one
source of information that brings together the infor-
mation represented in the best of the ITF monetary
42 For example, both include a forecast for the gap in their inflation
reports.
43 These definitions come from the Oxford English Dictionary, definitions
2a and 2b of transparent, respectively.
41 Certainly no fixed horizon shorter than a business cycle.
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policy reports. Due to the sheer bulk of reports to
Congress, testimony and speeches by FOMC mem-
bers, and publications by the Board and 12 member
banks, it would be a daunting (and unenviable) task
to confirm reliably which topics are covered and
which are not. A key issue facing the Fed in vigor-
ously pursuing effective transparency is whether
this material can be more concisely packaged and
delivered, while respecting the diverse committee
structure of the FOMC.
Suggestion 4. Central banks should strive to
communicate clearly the likely course of policy. If
forecasts are part of this process, the relationship
between the forecasts and the future course of policy
should be explained.
If policy cannot be codified in a simple rule, as
we have assumed, then helping the public under-
stand the likely course of policy is an essential part
of effective policymaking. Central bank forecasts
are a central feature of the monetary policy reports
of ITF banks. While such forecasts can and do play
many roles,44 determining the proper role of fore-
casts in shaping policy expectations is more complex
than usually recognized.45 Under standard practice,
the forecasts are of unclear value in understanding
the course of policy.
For example, it is standard practice to report a
forecast for output and inflation conditioned on some
counterfactual path for policy such as a constant
policy rate. These forecasts are generally depicted
as judgmental, and the reader cannot know the
model in more than general terms. It is very difficult
to see how such a forecast has any marginal value
in predicting the course of policy, beyond the pre-
dictive power of the standard data available to the
public. For example, if the central bank optimizes
in the LET view, then the public certainly cannot
deduce that a conditional forecast of inflation above
target means policy will be tightened. Further, releas-
ing a forecast for output growth (which is only ten-
uously related to the gap or other relevant notions
of slack) provides little help. Only if there is a known
mapping from the conditional forecast to policy is
that forecast of clear use.46
In contrast, an unconditional forecast of goal
variables and the policy rate would shed a good
deal of light on policy. Given that the public already
has its own unconditional forecast of the economy
and policy, the public can see if the two forecasts
differ and, by comparing the policy rate forecasts,
make an attempt to deduce whether those differ-
ences stem from different views of the future path
of policy or from different views of other aspects
of the economy.47
Of course, central banks have historically been
very wary of providing direct information about the
future course of policy. The political countervailing
interests may be overwhelming. Absent direct infor-
mation about the future course of policy, a more
thorough discussion of the link between the forecast
and future policy would be useful.48
8.2 Summing Up
Overall, our four suggestions for best-practice
reflect the views that central banks should have clear,
though possibly conflicting, goals and should aspire
to maximize public understanding of policy. Advo-
cates and practitioners of the ITF deserve great credit
for their many contributions to clear goal setting
and communication by central banks. Our suggested
approach differs from the standard ITF approach
in that we more strongly reject the folk wisdom of
central banking that all communication should be
couched in terms of inflation. Further, we do not
favor the use of concrete but inherently suboptimal
yardsticks for measuring central bank performance.
We advocate a more “candid and open” approach
to transparency.
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BACKWARD-LOOKING VERSION
In the backward-looking version, φ=1 and κ=0. Therefore, the loss function with the output gap 
eliminated using the Phillips curve is
(A.1)
The first-order condition for πt+j is
(A.2)
Taking the unconditional expectation of equation (A.2) yields the result that π –=π*. Using this result, 
collecting terms, and multiplying through by –α
2 yields
(A.3)
The roots represented by Λ and Ψ are 
(A.4)
.
Using standard methods we obtain the solutions:
(A.5)
where y ˜t+j=yt+j – y
P. A positive cost shock increases inflation and reduces output.
Taking expectations conditioned on information at time t yields the forecasts
(A.6)
as stated in the text. By repeated substitution
(A.7)
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Now we derive the unconditional efficient policy frontier implied by the optimal commitment rule. We




ε has been set equal to one for simplicity. To complete the derivation, we invert the expression for
σ
2
π ˜ to obtain an expression for Λ in terms of σ
2




The policy frontier has a negative slope and is convex to the origin since
(A.10)
(A.11)
An increase in σ
2




In the forward-looking version, φ=0 and κ >0. The loss function with the output gap eliminated using the
Phillips curve is
(A.12)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the only shock occurs in period t.
DISCRETION
Under discretion, the first-order condition for πt+j holding πt+j+1 constant is
(A.13)
Taking the unconditional expectation yields the familiar inflation bias result
(A.14)
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It will be optimal to have no deviations from period  t+1 on because there are no shocks then. Therefore
the solution for the deviation in period t is
(A.16)
and the full solutions for inflation in period t and all other periods are 
(A.17)
COMMITMENT
Under commitment, the first-order condition for any period except period t is
(A.18)
Taking unconditional expectations yields the familiar commitment result that
(A.19)





where the condition (A.20) for π 8
t+1 is the only one with a shock term. Note that the distortion term does
not enter these conditions. Solving the difference equation (A.21) yields 
(A.23)
The first-order condition for period t in deviation form is 
(A.24)
Multiplying through by α
2, collecting terms, and rearranging yields
(A.25)
The first-order conditions for π 8
t and π 8
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where π 8
t+2 has been eliminated from equation (A.20) using equation (A.23) for j=1 and A and Λ are







where all of the C’s are positive and the C’s for period t differ from those for period t+1 and all other periods.
First suppose that target output is above potential (κ >0) but that there is no shock (εt=0). It can be shown
that the inflation rate starts out above π* by less than under discretion and approaches π* asymptotically
and that output starts above y
P and approaches y
P asymptotically. Now suppose that κ =0 and εt >0. It
can be shown that inflation is above π* in period t, below π* from period t+1 on, and approaches π*
asymptotically.
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